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ATTEMPT TO COMMIT CRIME-How NEAR CONSUMMATION AcT MUST BE,TO BE INDICABE.-TH.E KING V. HARRY ROBINSON, 2 K. B. 342, 84
L. J. K. B. I49.-Appellant insured his stock of jewelry against burglary,then rifled his own safe and had himself bound to a chair, to present the
appearance of having been robbed. He then set up an outcry, and told
the police sergeant, who came in response, that he had been knocked on
the head by some intruder. On investigation the jewelry was found and
appellant confessed to having devised the fraud in order to obtain theinsurance money. Appellant was indicted and convicted of attempting to
obtain money under false pretenses. The conviction was quashed in theCourt of Criminal Appeal. Held, that since there must be some act beyond
mere preparation to constitute attempt, it is not sufficient to show that the
accused made the false pretense to a third person with the expectation
that the latter would report it to the person intended to be defrauded.
Bishop defines criminal attempt as "the intent to do a particular criminal
thing, combined with an act which falls short of the thing intended."
I Bish. Crim. Law, sec. 728. Many English and American courts, findingintent in the act, hold that no effort is an indictable attempt, unless it hasgone so far that, if not frustrated by extraneous circumstances, it wouldhave resulted in full consummation of the actual crime. Reg. v. Collins,
L. and C. 471, Reg. v. Eagleton, 24 L. J. M. C. 158; State v. Hewett, 158
N. C. 627; State v. Davidson, 172 Mo. App. 356; People v. Grubb, 141Pac. (Cal. App.) io5 r. Under this doctrine the principal case is correctly
decided. The difficulty that presents itself is that in many cases, especially
where the last physical act of the offender is simultaneous with the com-pletion of the crime, no indictment for the attempt could with certainty be
made save where indictment for the crime would also be possible. In
recognition of this fact, though perhaps not avowedly, some courts prefer
the more general interpretation: "an act done in part execution of adesign to commit a crime." State v. Harwick, 133 La. 545; State v.Donovan, go At. (Del. Gen. Sess.) 22o; State v. Lampe, 154 N. W.(Minn.) 737; State v. Huber, 148 Pac. (Nev.) 562.
C. B.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CARRIERS-REGULATION OF JITNEYS.-CITY OF
MEMPHIS V. STATE EX REL. RYALS, 179 S. W. (TENN.) 63r1.-Held, Acts
1915, c. 6o, regulating jitneys as common carriers, and prohibiting their
operation except upon prescribed conditions does not make an arbitrary
classification, but is a valid exercise of the police power.
An interesting example of the application of well established legal
doctrines to a new situation is evidenced by a line of- recent decisions
passing upon the validity of legislative regulations of the jitney. The
state has undoubted power to protect the health and welfare of its people,
and to impose restrictions having reasonable relation to that end. The
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nature and extent of these restrictions are matters for Jegislative judg-
ment, and unless the regulation is palpably unreasonable and arbitrary,
the court is not at liberty to say that it passes beyond the limits of the
state's protective power. McClean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539; Price v.
Illinois, 238 U. S. 446. The specific regulation of one kind of business,
which may be necessary for the protection of the public, can never be the
just ground of complaint because like restrictions are not imposed upon
other businesses of a different kind. Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703;
Booth v. Indiana, 237 U. S. 391. The use of automobiles in the city
streets may be regulated by statute, and under certain circumstances by
ordinance. II Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed.), p. io86. A
regulation requiring operators of automobiles to pay a registration fee is
constitutional. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 188 Mass. 79. Regulations limiting
the speed of automobiles are not invalid because of unreasonable discrim-
ination. Christy v. Elliott, 216 Ill. 31; Schaar v. Comforth, 151 N. W.
(Minn.) 275. The statute under consideration in the principal case was
passed upoit and upheld in Nolen v. Reichman, 225 Fed. 812. The District
Court said, "Here is a ne-d class of common carriers clearly pointed out
and defined in the law, differing in material respects from other common
carriers." Ordinances and statutes regulating the operation of jitneys have
been held valid by other courts. Ex parte Cardinal, i5o Pac. (Cal.) 348;
Ex parte Dickey, 85 S. E. (W. Va.) 781; Green v. City of San Antonio,
178 S. W. (Tex.) 6; Pub. Serv. Commission v. Booth, 156 N. Y. S. 14o.
The principal case is clearly supported by authority, and seems correct in
principle in view of the peculiar character and functions of the jitney,
pointed out by Mr. Justice Williams at p. 633. S. H. S.
CRIMINAL LAw-TIAL-CusToDY OF Juiy.-LEE v. STATE, 179 S. W.
(TENN.) i45.-Held, in a capital case it is reversible error to permit the
jury to go at large pending the trial, even though the accused consent,
thus depriving him of his constitutional guaranties of a fair trial by jury.
In non-capital cases the court may at its discretion allow the jury to
separate. People z. Stowers, 254 Ill. 588; Commonwealth v. Simon, 44
Pa. Super. Ct. 538, 545. And when so separated, prejudice to accused will
not be presumed. State v. Baudoin, I15 La. 773; contra, State v. Bennett,
71 Wash. 673. But separation of jurors in a capital case is ground for
reversal. State v. Gray, i00 Mo. 523. Unless the veniremen are not yet
sworn as jurors. Bell v. State, 14o Ala. 57; State v. Todd, 146 Mo. 295.
But if separated after being sworn in, prejudice will be presumed. People
v. Adams, 143 Cal. 2o8. However, if the state shows by affidavits of jurors
that they were not subjected to improper influences while separated, State v.
Schaeffer, 172 Mo. 335; or that the separation was necessary and permitted
and the jurors accompanied by a sworn court officer, Bilton v. Territory,
99 Pac. (Okla.) 163, no error will be found. And a further exception is
made when counsel for the accused consents to the separation of the jury.
Carter v. State, io Ga. App. 851. The rule in the principal case seems to
be the best one from the standpoint of protection to the accused. Consent
to a separation of the jury if refused by accused would undoubtedly
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materially prejudice the jury against him, so that any consent he might
give would be given under coercion. It is therefore best to make it
impossible for him to consent.
L. S.
ELECTRIcITY-STREETS-INJURIES CAUSED BY OBSTRUCrIONS.-PORTER V.
MUNICIPAL GAS Co. OF CITY OF ALBANY, I55 N. Y. Supp. 633.-The defend-
ant's electric light wire, strung diagonally across the street, 28/2 to 4o
feet above the ground, prevented firemen from raising an aerial ladder
to the burning building, from which the plaintiff was, accordingly, forced
to jump. In the suit for the resulting injuries to the plaintiff, held, that
it was a question for the jury, whether the maintenance of electric light
wires in the above manner by the defendant constituted negligence.
Those engaged in business requiring the use of electric currents are
uniformly bound to take nothing less than the greatest possible care to
safeguard customers and the public from accidents peculiar to the nature
of electricity. Smith's Admrs. v. Middlesboro Electric Co., 174 S. W.
(Ky.) 773; Cochran v. Young-Hartsell Mills Co., 85 S. E. (N. C.) 149;
Wade v. Empire Distributing Electric Co., 147 Pac. (Kan.) 63. There is
usually a question for the jury at least, even in ordinary accidents not
involving the source of this heavy responsibility, such as, for instance, the
physical impact from falling wires. Fitsimmons v. Phila. Rapid Transit
Co., 56 Pa. Superior Ct. 365; Walter v. Baltimore Electric Co., iog Md.
327. Or from falling light globes. Sweeney v. Edison Electric Illuminat-
ing Co. of Brooklyn, 143 N. Y. S. 636; Louisville Lighting Co. v. Owens,
32 Ky. Law Rep. 283. But the question of an electric company's responsi-
bility with regard to the use of the highway for modern fire-fighting is
riew. Lambert v. Westchester Elevated R. R. Co., 191 N. Y. 248-cited in
the principal case-involved injury to a fireman caused by striking against
one of the defendant's poles, set close to the fire station alley, as the
fireman was mounting the moving wagon. Here the defendant's negligence
was held to be a question for the jury. The effect of the principal case
is to extend the obligation of corporations stringing wires along the
highway, so as to include not only taking very great precautions as to
insulation and non-interference with traffic by the location of its poles and
wires but also seeing to it that no obstruction is presented in such emer-
gencies as fire. In the average narrow American'business street this seems
wellnigh impossible, without forbidding altogether the use of overhead
wiring systems.
C. B.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES TO SERVANT-WORKMAN'S COMPENSA-
TION AcT-CoNSTRUCTION OF AcT-DIsEASE AN ACcIDENT.-VENNEN V.
NEWS DELLS LUMBER CO., 154 N. W. (Wis.) 64o.-An employee's death
was caused by typhoid fever contracted by reason of impure drinking
water furnished by the master. Held, there is a right to compensation,
for such a happening is an accident within the intent of the Workman's
Compensation Act as 'being a personal injury accidentally sustained by the
employee.'
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An accident is any event which takes place without the foresight or
expectation of the person acted upon or affected by the event. Crandal
v. Accident Ins. Co., 27 Fed. 40. The laws of accident insurance are
applied to injuries under the Act. Wicks v. Dowell & Co., Ltd., i9o5
2 K. B. 225. A liberal construction should be given to any set of facts.
Sadowski v. Thomas Furnace Co., 157 Wis. 443. To consider a disease
accidental there must be an accidental cause, as distinct from the disease
itself. Columbia Paper Stock Co. v. Fidelity Co., io4 Mo. App. i57;
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Melick, 65 Fed. 178; Delaney v. Modern Acc. Club,
121 Iowa 528. So a disease which results from a cause known and fore-
seen at the time as likely to produce the result cannot be included under
the tern accidental. Sinclair v. Maritime Pass. Co., 3 E. & E. 478;
Dozier v. Fidelity Co., 46 Fed. 446. That the cases are at variance may be
seen from a comparison of Britons, Ltd. v. Turvey, 1905 A. C. 230, and
Bacon v. U. S. Mut. Acc. Assoc., 123 N. Y. 304. Recovery was allowed
in the former and denied in the latter, in both cases the disease being
anthrax. The distinction seems to hinge on whether or not the cause of
the contraction of the disease was accidental. In the principal case this
requisite seems to be fulfilled and although the courts are not settled, yet
the holding seems to accord with the intent of the legislature which
enacted the act in question. J. McD.
MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcT-DEFINITION OF
"ACCIDENT."-WESTERN INDEMNITY Co. v. PILLSBURY, 151 PAC. (CAL.) 398.-
A foreman, in disputing with one of the laborers under his direction, as
to the manner of performing certain work, was severely injured and
lacerated by the angered workman, in the quarrel which ensued. Held,
such injury may be termed an "accident," within the terms of the
Workmen's Comprensation Act. Henshaw, J., dissenting.
An accident has been defined as an event happening without the concur-
rence or the will of the person by whose agency it was caused. 'Etna Life
Insurance Co. v. Vandecar, 86 Fed. 282. The first formulation of such a
definition of the word as applied to workmen's compensation laws is to
be found in the case of United States Mutual Accident Association v.
Barry, 131 U. S. ioo. That case defines an accident as an unusual and
unexpected result attending the performance of a usual and necessary act.
Also Williams v. U. S. Mut. Acc. Ass't, 14 N. Y. Supp. 728, 730. The
English cases, in deciding actions under their Workmen's Compensation
Act, seem to have been influenced by this view. Where a school teacher
had incurred the hostility of some of the pupils because of his strict
discipline, and was assaulted by them so grievously that he died, the event
was held an accident, irising in the course of his employment. Kelly v.
District School, 136 L. T. R. (H. L.) 6o5 (i914). Where an employee was
shot by a third person in the course of carrying wages to a colliery, he
was held entitled to compensation. Nesbit v. Rayne, 3 B. W. C. C. 507
(igio). A gamekeeper, attacked and injured by poachers, was held to
have been disabled by an accident. Anderson v. Balfour, 2 I. R. 497
(I91o) (Cherry, J. dissenting). The dissenting opinion seeks to define
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accident from the point of view of the intent of the third party to work
the injury: holding that only without such intent could the deed be
denominated an accident. But it is from the point of view of the employee
that the question must be considered, and so these .cases hold that from
such point of view, a deliberate and intentional deed by another can be
termed an accident, always provided the employee has not engaged in. a
private altercation on his own account. See Matter of Employers' Liability
Assurance Corporation, io2 N. E. (Mass.) 697.
A. N. H.
TRADE-MARKS AND TRADE-NAMEs-DEscRIPTIvE WoRis.-N. Y. AND N. J.
LUBRICANT Co. v. YOUNG, 94 ATL. (N. J.) 57o.-Plaintiff put on the market
an article which it called "non-fluid oil." It had the consistency of a
grease but was composed of *oil to an extent varying from 75 to 95 per
cent. Held, the words "non-fluid oil" are descriptive, and plaintiff is not
entitled to an exclusive property right therein. Kalisch, Black, and
Williams, JJ., dissenting.
Names which are mere descriptive terms of a business and generic in
their nature are not capable of being appropriated and there can be no
unfair competition arising from the use of such names. Furniture
Hospital v. Dorfman, 179 Mo. App. 302. For example, "always closed,"
as applied to a revolving door. Van Kannel Revolving Door Co. v. Ameri-
can Revolving Door Co., 215 Fed. 582, 131 C. C. A. 65o. "Inter-phone,"
as applied to telephone switching apparatus. In re Western Electric Co.,
39 App. D. C. 42o. "Brilliant," as applied to designate one kind of flour.
Sauers Milling Co. v. Kehlor Mills Co., 39 App. D. C. 535. "Union," as
applied to tobacco packages. American Tobacco Co. v. Globe Tobacco Co.,
193 Fed. ioi5. "No-sag," as applied to handbags. In re Freund Bros. and
Co., 37 App. D. C. iog. But non-exclusive trade-marks or names which
all may use because descriptive, may yet by long use in connection with
the goods or business of a particular trader, come to have a secondary
meaning and though the primary meaning of the word is publici juris its
secondary meaning is not. Furniture Hospital v. Dorfnan (supra.). Thus
the name "Furniture Hopital," though descriptive, was yet so unusual
as to be capable of being appropriated as a trade-name; and in the case
of the National Cloak Co. v. Londy & Friend, 211 Fed. 76o, the word
"National" as applied to the cloak business, while not distinctive, was held
to have acquired a meaning which was plaintiff's property. Also in the
case of IV. Y. Mackintosh Co. v. Ham, 198 Fed. 571, the word "Bestyette"
was held to be sufficiently distinctive to be a valid trade-mark for cloaks.
The same was held as to the word "cream" as a trade-name for a baking-
powder. International Food Co. v. Price Baking Powder Co., 37 App.
D. C. 137.
S. B.
WILLS--PROBATE AND ESTABLISHMENT-PLEADING-UNDUE INFLUENCE.-
CUNNINGHAME V. HERRING, 70 So. (ALA.) I48.-Held, In a proceeding
contesting a will, a bare allegation of undue influence without averment of
the quo modo of its exercise is sufficient, and is not subject to demurrer
for failure to set out the facts.
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In a suit to contest a will, an allegation that the will was not duly
executed is sufficient to include duress, fraud and whatever else goes to
impeach the execution thereof. Willett v. Porter, 42 Ind. 25o; Reed v.
Watson, 27 Ind. 443. Thus an allegation of undue influence whereby the
testator discriminated against his daughter need not show in what the
undue influence consisted, or the. facts relied on as a basis for recovery.
Scott v. Townsend, 159 S. W. (Tex.) 342. A bill to set aside probate of
a will on grounds of fraud need not set out the precise manner in which
the fraud was accomplished. Smith v. Boyd, 127 Mich. 417. In Coghill
v. Kennedy, I19 Ala. 641, it is said, "To require contestant to state the
means by which undue influence was acquired and the manner in which it
was exercised, would be to require that which in most cases is impossible."
See also McLeod v. McLeod, 137 Ala. 267, and Phillips v. Bradford, 147
Ala. 352. But there are authorities contrary to this and to the doctrine
of the principal case. For example, in a suit attacking the validity of a
will, an allegation that "the defendant and another conspired with others
and exercised undue influence over the testatrix'to fraudulently-procure the
execution of such will," was held bad on demurrer as not stating sufficient
facts. Brown v. Mitchell, 75 Tex. 9. And in Alabama it has been held
that an allegation that a will was procured by fraud and undue influence
must state the particular facts relied on and a general allegation is not
sufficient. Barksdale v. Davis, 114 Ala. 623. Allegations. in a will contest
must sufficiently show the particular acts involving undue influence.
In re Olson's Estate, ig Cal. App. 379. To the same effect Ross v. Kell,
159 S. W. (Tex.) ri9. The same thing is true as to fraud. Story v.
Story, 1i8 Mo. iio; Gray v. Parks, 125 S. W. (Ark.) io23. But allega-
tions of acts of undue influence need not go into much detail. Alexander
v. Gibson, 57 So. (Ala.) 76o; Murphy v. Nett, 130 Pac. (Mont.) 451.
S. B.
